Why syria regime is doomed

Pro-Assad forces have now regained territory in southern and central Syria, most of the Damsacus suburbs, and the opposition stronghold of Homs. Russian, Iranian, Hezbollah and regime-backed troops and militias cleared IS from the ancient city of Palymyra , pushed them away from Aleppo, and then pressed on right up to the Iraqi border. Yet Assad still does not control large swaths of the country. The prospect of the opposition displacing the Assad regime, or even securing representation in a national government, is long gone.

Elsewhere, the Southern Front rebel group has been abandoned by the US-led operations centre, but still holds parts of Dara'a province, including a share of Dara'a city, where the uprising began in March HTS was created in January and includes the faction Jabhat al-Nusra, involved in the Syria conflict since and formerly linked to al-Qaeda.

The PYD ascendancy is far from secure. The regime, unsettled by the Kurdish hold on valuable assets such as oil and gas fields, has promised a showdown if there is no SDF withdrawal. And now Ankara has delivered on its promise of a campaign against the Afrin canton in the northwest and on other Kurdish-held areas such as the city of Manbij.

But Pro-Assad forces and in some cases, Russian warplanes have repeatedly subjected the zones to attacks and sieges. In December , one assault finally overwhelmed an opposition pocket near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

But that would mean merely changing the face of the regime without changing its character. And it would require denying Syrians the right to democratically elect their own government. That would likely be unacceptable to the opposition, and it's hard to imagine the rebels putting down their arms in such a scenario. Maybe there is a possibility for something like Lebanon's Taif Agreement, which helped end the country's civil war by establishing a government that is democratic but that also enshrines government roles based on religion and ethnicity for example, the prime minister must be Sunni and the president Christian so that those groups have a fair say.

But Syria's demographics make this harder: The population is about three-quarters Sunni. It's difficult to imagine a Taif-style agreement that would satisfy Sunnis that the era of sectarian rule was over, while sufficiently empowering Alawites as to satisfy Iran that their interests would be protected. Again, it comes back to Assad, or at least someone like him. Iran currently seems all but certain to reject any deal whereby its interests are not guaranteed. But those interests are pretty substantial: Iran wants a Syria that is aligned with it and against both Israel and the Gulf Sunni states.

The only sort of Syrian government that seems likely to deliver this is one ruled by Alawites — by people like Assad who will need Iran's support. Russia is easier. It, too, is in Syria in large part to protect its interests there as well as to further other goals.

That means a Syrian government that is pro-Moscow and that will allow Russia to keep its military bases there — its last remaining ally outside of the former Soviet sphere. Unlike Iran, though, Russia does not need the Syrian government to be sectarian and minority-rule in order for it to get what it wants. There is no reason a Sunni-led Syria could not maintain military basing deals with Russia. It's not going to be easy for Moscow to agree to full elections and democracy in Syria, knowing that many Syrians identify Russia as aligned with the hated Assad regime, and given that Russia is currently bombing Syrian rebels.

Still, it is not impossible to imagine the opposition agreeing to a peace deal that grants Russia certain concessions, or promising that Alawites will retain senior defense positions, thus allowing Russia to keep its contacts in the Syrian military. Some in the US government believe, for this reason, that Moscow isn't just bluffing when it says that it would accept Assad's departure. And they believe, with reason, that Moscow could give in on the larger and more important question of retaining Alawite minority rule.

But even if Iran gives up Assad — which it currently has shown no sign of seriously considering — there is every reason to believe that it would insist on replacing him with someone else just like him. The American strategy, at this point, appears to be one primarily of diplomacy and pressure: diplomacy to find and exploit any glimmer of an opening or a common ground, and pressure to try to compel Russia and Iran to conclude that further fighting in Syria won't win them anything, so they should cash out now and accept whatever compromises are necessary for a peace deal.

That strategy has the merits of neither worsening the violence nor costing any American lives. But Russia and Iran have both already demonstrated they are willing to endure terrible costs in Syria to prop up Assad. It is not clear that anything the US is willing to do or maybe even can do will convince Iran and Russia that they are better off cutting their losses.

The question hanging over Vienna, then, is in many ways the same question that began the war: whether Syria will retain Assad-style minority Alawite rule. The answer to this, from both Iran and the Syrian opposition, is definitive, categorical, and mutually exclusive. There is no obvious middle ground, and thus there is every reason to believe that they will continue fighting.

And as long as they are both fighting, the war will drag on. That's a sensible way forward," he said. He said, however, that he would continue to work alongside the Russian and Chinese governments, and planned to contact Russia's foreign minister when he returns from a visit to Syria later this week.

We want them to change their position," Hague said. Asked about plans by Arab countries to expel Syrian diplomats, Hague said that Britain's diplomatic options wre constantly being reviewed but any announcement would first be made to parliamentt. Hague said the UK had reduced its embassy operations in Syria to an absolute minimum and reiterated the government's position of ruling out military intervention, stressing the differences with last year's regime change in Libya.

Given what has happened this weekend, we could not pass such a resolution. Secondly, the consequences would be far more difficult to foresee in Syria than they were in the relatively straightforward Libya because of the knock on effects across the region.

Thirdly it would have to be on a dramatically bigger scale in Syria in order to be effective," he said. The Sino-Russian veto was intended to promote a political settlement, China's state news agency Xinhua said in an article today. It "aimed at further seeking peaceful settlement of the chronic Syrian crisis and preventing possible drastic and risky solutions to it," the piece said.